Tuesday, March 18, 2008

Nouriel Roubini's Global EconoMonitor

A Generalized Run on the Shadow Financial System
Nouriel Roubini | Mar 17, 2008
Since the onset of the liquidity and credit crunch last summer this column has been arguing that monetary policy would be impotent to address such a crunch because, in part, of the existence of a non-bank “shadow financial system”. This system is composed of conduits, SIVs, investment banks/broker dealers, money market funds, hedge funds and other non bank financial institutions.


All these institutions look similar to banks because they are highly leveraged and borrow short and in liquid ways and invest or lend long and in illiquid ways. This shadow financial system is, like banks, subject not only to credit and market risk but also to rollover or liquidity risk, i.e. the risk deriving from having a large stock of short term liabilities (relative to liquid assets) that may not roll over if creditors decide to withdraw their credits to these institutions.


Unlike banks this shadow financial system does not have access to the lender of last resort support of the central bank as these are not depository institutions regulated by the central banks. What we are now observing – with the case of Bear Stearns and the recent disaster among SIVs, conduits, run on a number of hedge funds and money market funds is a generalized liquidity run on this shadow financial system.


The response of the Fed to this run has been radical and in the form of the extension of the lender of last resort support to non bank financial institutions. Specifically, the new $200 bn term facility allows primary dealers – many of which are non banks – to swap their toxic mortgage backed securities for US Treasuries; second, the Fed provided emergency support to Bear Stearns and following the purchase of Bear Stearns by JPMorgan, is now providing a $30 bn plus support to JPMorgan to help the rescue of Bear Stearns; finally, now the Fed is allowing primary dealers to access the Fed discount window at the same terms as banks.


This is the most radical change and expansions of Fed powers and functions since the Great Depression: essentially the Fed now can lend unlimited amounts to non bank highly leveraged institutions that it does not regulate. The Fed is treating this run on the shadow financial system as a liquidity run but the Fed has no idea of whether such institutions are insolvent. As JPMorgan paid only about $200 million for Bear Stearns – and only after the Fed promised a $30 billlion loan – this was a clear case where this non bank financial institution was insolvent.


The Fed has no idea of which other primary dealers may be insolvent as it does not supervise and regulate those primary dealers that are not banks. But it is treating this crisis – the most severe financial crisis in the US since the Great Depression – as if it was purely a liquidity crisis. By lending massive amounts to potentially insolvent institutions that it does not supervise or regulate and that may be insolvent the Fed is taking serious financial risks and seriously exacerbate moral hazard distortions. Here you have highly leveraged non bank financial institutions that made reckless investments and lending, had extremely poor risk management and altogether disregarded liquidity risks; some may be insolvent but now the Fed is providing them with a blank check for unlimited amounts. This is a most radical action and a signal of how severe the crisis of the banking system and non-bank shadow financial system is. This is the worst US financial crisis since the Great Depression and the Fed is treating it as if it was only a liquidity crisis. But this is not just a liquidity crisis; it is rather a credit and insolvency crisis. And it is not the job of the Fed to bail out insolvent non bank financial institutions. If a bail out should occur this is a fiscal policy action that should be decided by Congress after the relevant equity holders have been wiped out and senior management fired without golden parachutes and huge severance packages.


Step 9 of the Financial Meltdown: "one or two large and systemically important broker dealers" will "go belly up"
Nouriel Roubini | Mar 14, 2008
In my February 5th piece on 12 Steps to a Financial Disaster I predicted - as Step 9 of the meltdown - that "one or two large and systemically important broker dealers" will "go belly up" and that other members of the "shadow financial system" - i.e. non-bank financial institutions that look like banks in terms of liquidity/rollover risk - will also go bankrupt. As I put it then:

Ninth, the “shadow banking system” (as defined by the PIMCO folks) or more precisely the “shadow financial system” (as it is composed by non-bank financial institutions) will soon get into serious trouble. This shadow financial system is composed of financial institutions that – like banks – borrow short and in liquid forms and lend or invest long in more illiquid assets. This system includes: SIVs, conduits, money market funds, monolines, investment banks, hedge funds and other non-bank financial institutions. All these institutions are subject to market risk, credit risk (given their risky investments) and especially liquidity/rollover risk as their short term liquid liabilities can be rolled off easily while their assets are more long term and illiquid. Unlike banks these non-bank financial institutions don’t have direct or indirect access to the central bank’s lender of last resort support as they are not depository institutions. Thus, in the case of financial distress and/or illiquidity they may go bankrupt because of both insolvency and/or lack of liquidity and inability to roll over or refinance their short term liabilities. Deepening problems in the economy and in the financial markets and poor risk managements will lead some of these institutions to go belly up: a few large hedge funds, a few money market funds, the entire SIV system and, possibly, one or two large and systemically important broker dealers. Dealing with the distress of this shadow financial system will be very problematic as this system – stressed by credit and liquidity problems - cannot be directly rescued by the central banks in the way that banks can. [bold added]

And today the first one of these large broker dealers - Bear Stearns - in on the verge of bankruptcy. Let us be clear: given its massive exposure to toxic MBS and ABS product Bear Stearns is insolvent; the decision by the NY Fed to try to bail out Bear Stearns would make sense if this firm was only illiquid; the trouble that it is insolvent and thus such attempted bailout is altogether inappropriate. It is true that Bear is a large broker dealer; but its systemic importance is much smaller than that of much larger institutions. The world and financial market can survive if Bear disappears.

So the only possible justification for such Fed action is to engineer an orderly rather than a disorderly shutdown of this institution. But unfortunately the Fed is behaving as if Bear Stearns is illiquid but solvent. That is delusional and the official sector support of an otherwise insolvent institution will end up - like many other recent Fed actions - being paid for by the US tax-payer.

As discussed months ago in this column non-banks institutions don't have access - based on the Federal Reserve Act - to the lender of last resort support of the Fed unless a very special and unusual procedure and vote is taken. So for the first time in decades - possibly since the Great Depression - the Fed had to rely on this exceptional rule to bail out a non-bank financial institution. So what is next? Bailing out hedge funds, bailing out money market funds, bailing out SIVs? When is enough enough? This when the Fed has already committed this week to swap 60% ($ 400 bn) of its balance sheet of Treasuries for mortgage backed securities of dubious quality and value.

And Bear is only the first broker dealer to go belly up. Rumors had been circulating in the market for days that the exposure of Lehman to toxic ABS/MBS securities is as bad as that of Bear: according to Fitch at the beginning of the turmoil Bear Stearns had the highest toxic waste ("residual balance") exposure as percent of adjusted equity on balance sheet; the exposure of Bear was 54.5% while that of Lehman was only marginally smaller at 53.3%; that of Goldman Sachs was only 21%. And guess what? Today Lehman received a $2 billion unsecured credit line from 40 lenders. Here is another massively leveraged broker dealer that mismanaged its liquidity risk, had massive amount of toxic waste on its books and is now in trouble. Again here we have not only a situation of illiquidity but serious credit problems and losses given the reckless exposure of this second broker dealer to toxic investments.

We will leave aside for today the fact that a growing number of members of the "shadow financial system" have gone belly up in the last month alone: the entire SIV scheme is being wound down and brought back on balance sheet; a few hedge funds are now closing shops (for details see the web site The Hedge Fund Impode-O-Meter) ); a few money market funds that had exposure to toxic MBS have experienced runs and had to be bailed out; a highly leveraged private equity bond fund has gone belly up; a major near prime mortgage lender is bankrupt. In all these cases a poisonous combination of liquidity risk and credit risk was exacerbated by reckless leverage.

So the question is: if Bear Stearns screwed up big time - as it did - with huge leverage, reckless investments, lousy risk management and massive underestimation of liquidity risk why should the US taxpayer bail out this firm and its shareholders? First fully wipe out those shareholders, then fire all the senior management and have the government take over such a bankrupt institution before a penny of public money is wasted in bailing it out. Instead now the use of public money to bail out financial institutions is spreading from banking ones to non banking ones. The Fed should at least give a clear and public explanation of why such extremely exceptional - and almost never used - intervention was justified.

Unless public money is used on a very temporary basis to achieve an orderly wind-down or merger of Bear Stearns this is another case where profits are privatized and losses are socialized. By having thrown down the drain the decades old doctrine and rule that the Fed should not lend or bail out non-bank financial institutions the Fed has created an extremely dangerous precedent that seriously aggravates the moral hazard of its lender of last resort support role. If the Fed starts on the slippery slope of providing massive liquidity support to non-bank financial institutions that have recklessly managed their risks it enters into uncharted territory that radically changes its mandate and formal role. Breaking decades-old rules and practices is a radical action that seriously requires a clear public explanation and justification.
Martin Wolf on My Estimates of Financial Losses: $1 Trillion is the New Size 6!
Nouriel Roubini | Mar 11, 2008
In his Wednesday Financial Times' column Martin Wolf thoughtfully discusses my recent argument that financial losses of the order of $1 trillion (7% of GDP) may be only a lower bound and that such losses may end up being as high as $1.7 trillion or even $2.7 trillion during this systemic financial crisis.

I agree with him that the highest estimates are "excessively pessimistic". They were provided as a way to show that, at this point, losses of the order of $1 trillion are only a lower bound - not an upper bound - to financial sector losses, not to argue that $2.7 trillion is "the" most likely outcome. Indeed, the most interesting development in the last few weeks is that estimates of financial losses of the order of $1 trillion - that only a month ago were considered way too pessimistic if not borderline crazy - have now become mainstream. As Wolf put it:

"On March 7, Goldman Sachs economists published an even higher estimate of mortgage-related losses, at $500bn, along with $656bn in other losses, for a total of $1,156bn. The mainstream has caught up."

So to paraphrase "The Devil Wears Prada" now $1 trillion "is the new size 6!", i.e. the new mainstream benchmark for expected financial losses. The mainstream has indeed caught up very fast.

But what about the more pessimistic scenarios of even bigger losses? Let us consider next this debate in more detail...


The Rising Risk of a Financial Meltdown and the Escalating Losses in the Financial System
Nouriel Roubini | Mar 10, 2008
Given the growing turmoil in financial, credit and equity markets my 12 steps scenario to a systemic financial meltdown is becoming more likely by the day; and my estimate that financial losses could end up being at least $1 trillion dollars – considered as an extreme worst case scenario a few weeks ago – is now being endorsed by an increasing number of serious analysts.

Let us consider the details of these seriously worsening financial conditions…


Risk of a systemic crisis is rising: the markets are becoming “utterly unhinged”, the financial system is “broken” and “everybody's in de-levering mode''
Nouriel Roubini | Mar 06, 2008
I have been away from blogging most of the week as I have been traveling to Abu Dhabi, Saudi Arabia, Dubai and Turkey.

Certainly concerns about the US economy, the credit crunch, the stability of the US financial system and the plunging value of the dollar are rising even among official authorities (central banks and sovereign wealth funds) that I have met in region in recent days.

Here are some of the spreading financial concerns and rising risks in financial markets…


from ....rgemonitor.com의 루비니블로그에서

경마가 예측시스템을 가지는 마이크로 베팅이라면
경제 또한 마찬가지의 시스템의 마크로적인 것으로 생각된다.

개인적으로 뭔가를 예측하고 그 예측에 대한 모델을 세우는 것을 경마란것에서 터득하다보니
작금의 경제에 대한 상황파악과 그에 대한 진단 이어서 예측을 행하는 다른의미의
이론가들, 거대시장의 행동가들(베터들), 이론가들에 대한 관심의 일환으로서 이 글을 올려본다.

루비니는 뉴욕대의 교수로
미국 서브프라임모기지시장의 붕괴를 예측했다.

보다 현명한 베터였다면 (개인적으로 2006년에 부동산이냐 금이냐의 선택에서 부동산을 베팅했던 나로서는,.. 지금으로선 아차,..이다.)
2006년쯤에 금쪽으로 방향설정을 했었거나 모기지관련 선물시장에서 풋옾션으로
매집을 해야 햇었을 것이다.(이 부분은 나로서는 불가능한 부분지만...)
일찌감치 루비니쪽과 맥을 같이하는 무리들-big odds chasers-punters그리고 ultimate market
handicappers)의 움직임은 그 쪽으로 갔겠고
그래서 이 혼란한 나락으로만 떨어지는 세태를 기회삼아 한몫을 거두고 유유히 떠나갔을거고.(?)
뒤늦게 시장변동을 눈치챈 사람들이 그들이 떠난자리를 아우성치며 달려갈거고,..
어쩜 경과장의 다른 버전이 아니겠는가...?

그런데 이 모든 혼란과 공황과 어려움, 닥쳐올 경제적핍박등의 그 모든 것을 감당해야하는 부담은 아이러니컬하게도
위의 표현대로 이익은 사유화되고 손실은 대중의 몫이 되어 챙기는 넘들은 일찌기챙겨 시치미를 떼고
결국은 손해를 본 구십구프로의 가난한 대중의 어꺠로 돌아갈 것이다.

한국이 그랬고,...
미국도 그럴것이다.
세계어디에고 그럴것이다.
동서고금을 막론하고 그래왔다.
불쌍한 대중들...


영리한 넘들은,...
왜 있지 않은가,..
스티븐 킹의 소설 쇼생크탈출의 주인공처럼,...

그들은 캐러비안이나 바하마 어딘가,혹은 유럽의 니스해안언저리에서
""샴페인과 캐비어의 나날""을 보내고 있을지도 모르겠다.

다시금 일깨우는 말,..인생은 선택과 베팅이다.

1 comment:

노바 said...

"인생은 선택과 베팅이다" 짧지만 가슴에와닿으면서 이밤 상념에 젖어들게 하는말인것 같습니다....꼭 기억해야쥐...^^